A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy

Shinsuke Nakamura

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-W

A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy

Shinsuke Nakamura

Faculty of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a weakly balanced and continuous mechanism which Nash-implements a Walrasian equilibrium correspondence in the two-agent economy, whereas there are several impossibility results in this economy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	5-9
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	34
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-W
Publication status	Published - 1990 Sept

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(90)90172-W

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A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy

Abstract

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