A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance

Sagiri Kitao

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A general equilibrium life-cycle model is developed, in which individuals choose a sequence of saving and labor supply faced with search frictions and uncertainty in longevity, health status and medical expenditures. Unemployed individuals decide whether to apply for disability insurance (DI) benefits if eligible. We investigate the effects of cash transfer and in-kind Medicare component of the DI system on the life-cycle employment. Without Medicare benefits, DI coverage could fall significantly. We also study how DI interacts with reforms of Social Security and Medicare and find that DI enrollment amplifies the effects of reforms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-18
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Monetary Economics
Volume68
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Life-cycle model
Disability insurance
Unemployment insurance
Medicare
Medical expenditures
Life cycle
Health status
Uncertainty
General equilibrium
Labor supply
Social security
Cash transfers
Search frictions
Enrollment

Keywords

  • Disability insurance
  • Labor force participation
  • Life-cycle
  • Medicare
  • Medicare
  • Social security
  • Unemployment insurance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance. / Kitao, Sagiri.

In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2014, p. 1-18.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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