A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment

Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe, Gabriele Esposito, Xiaoyan Lu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, 2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjects made less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)827-850
Number of pages24
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume43
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Nov 20

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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