TY - JOUR
T1 - A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
AU - Bando, Keisuke
AU - Imamura, Kenzo
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors thank Bettina Klaus, Ryo Kawasaki, Shigeo Muto, Hirofumi Yamamura, Takehiko Yamato, the associated editor and two referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. The authors also thank the participants of UECE Lisbon Meetings 2014 in Game Theory and Applications and the workshop at Tokyo Metropolitan University. Keisuke Bando acknowledges the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for financial support through the Research Activities Start-up (No. 26885028) and Kenzo Imamura acknowledges the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for financial support through Grants-In-Aid for JSPS fellows (No. 14J11407).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
PY - 2016/10/1
Y1 - 2016/10/1
N2 - We consider an allocation problem with indivisible goods, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonic allocation rules under non-wastefulness. The condition is based on robustness to group manipulation. Specifically, we introduce a new condition called the no improvement property of unmatched agents which means that unmatched agents cannot be strictly better off through any group manipulation. We show that a non-wasteful allocation rule satisfies weak Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisfies the no improvement property of unmatched agents and weak group strategy-proofness. In addition, together with our result and that of Kojima and Manea (Econometrica 78:633–653, 2010), the deferred acceptance (DA) rules with acceptant substitutable priorities are characterized based on the conditions related to robustness to group manipulation.
AB - We consider an allocation problem with indivisible goods, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonic allocation rules under non-wastefulness. The condition is based on robustness to group manipulation. Specifically, we introduce a new condition called the no improvement property of unmatched agents which means that unmatched agents cannot be strictly better off through any group manipulation. We show that a non-wasteful allocation rule satisfies weak Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisfies the no improvement property of unmatched agents and weak group strategy-proofness. In addition, together with our result and that of Kojima and Manea (Econometrica 78:633–653, 2010), the deferred acceptance (DA) rules with acceptant substitutable priorities are characterized based on the conditions related to robustness to group manipulation.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-016-0984-x
DO - 10.1007/s00355-016-0984-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84982786501
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 47
SP - 589
EP - 606
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 3
ER -