A note on network formation with decay

Nobuo Matsubayashi, Shigetaka Yamakawa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies an endogenous network formation with decay. We introduce a strategic form game based on a simple bilateral cost allocation rule. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium of this game always exists and necessarily achieves efficient networks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)387-392
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume93
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Dec 1

Keywords

  • Decay
  • Efficient network
  • Endogenous cost allocation
  • Network formation
  • Strong Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A note on network formation with decay'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this