A note on network formation with decay

Nobuo Matsubayashi, Shigetaka Yamakawa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies an endogenous network formation with decay. We introduce a strategic form game based on a simple bilateral cost allocation rule. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium of this game always exists and necessarily achieves efficient networks.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)387-392
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume93
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Dec

Fingerprint

Allocation rules
Cost allocation
Network formation
Game form
Decay
Strong Nash equilibrium
Bilateral

Keywords

  • Decay
  • Efficient network
  • Endogenous cost allocation
  • Network formation
  • Strong Nash equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

A note on network formation with decay. / Matsubayashi, Nobuo; Yamakawa, Shigetaka.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 93, No. 3, 12.2006, p. 387-392.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Matsubayashi, Nobuo ; Yamakawa, Shigetaka. / A note on network formation with decay. In: Economics Letters. 2006 ; Vol. 93, No. 3. pp. 387-392.
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