A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms

Nobuo Matsubayashi, Yoshiyasu Yamada

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers' loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers' price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers' sensitivity as well as lower consumers' loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms' equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm's profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)571-581
Number of pages11
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume187
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Jun 1

Fingerprint

firm
Profitability
asymmetry
Asymmetry
profit
Profit
loyalty
Business
Price competition
Quality competition
Asymmetric firms
Competitive Strategy
consumer price
market price
microeconomics
Industry
purchase
Maximise
Tend
Small firms

Keywords

  • Consumers' loyalty
  • Consumers' sensitivity
  • Economics
  • Non-cooperative game
  • Price and quality competition
  • Vertical and horizontal differentiation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Transportation

Cite this

A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms. / Matsubayashi, Nobuo; Yamada, Yoshiyasu.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 187, No. 2, 01.06.2008, p. 571-581.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{0bf676faa173423586afee38bcd85f3f,
title = "A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms",
abstract = "This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers' loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers' price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers' sensitivity as well as lower consumers' loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms' equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm's profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.",
keywords = "Consumers' loyalty, Consumers' sensitivity, Economics, Non-cooperative game, Price and quality competition, Vertical and horizontal differentiation",
author = "Nobuo Matsubayashi and Yoshiyasu Yamada",
year = "2008",
month = "6",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.ejor.2007.03.021",
language = "English",
volume = "187",
pages = "571--581",
journal = "European Journal of Operational Research",
issn = "0377-2217",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms

AU - Matsubayashi, Nobuo

AU - Yamada, Yoshiyasu

PY - 2008/6/1

Y1 - 2008/6/1

N2 - This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers' loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers' price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers' sensitivity as well as lower consumers' loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms' equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm's profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.

AB - This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers' loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers' price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers' sensitivity as well as lower consumers' loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms' equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm's profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.

KW - Consumers' loyalty

KW - Consumers' sensitivity

KW - Economics

KW - Non-cooperative game

KW - Price and quality competition

KW - Vertical and horizontal differentiation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=36048997478&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=36048997478&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.03.021

DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.03.021

M3 - Article

VL - 187

SP - 571

EP - 581

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

SN - 0377-2217

IS - 2

ER -