A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

Toyotaka Sakai

doi:10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a general one-to-many matching model with contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (Ame Econ Rev 95:913-935, 2005) show that the doctor optimal stable rule is strategy-proof from the doctor side. We strengthen their result by showing that this rule is in fact the unique stable rule that is strategy-proof from the doctor side.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	337-342
Number of pages	6
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	15
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8
Publication status	Published - 2011 Dec 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Matching with contracts
Stability
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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