A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

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2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a general one-to-many matching model with contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (Ame Econ Rev 95:913-935, 2005) show that the doctor optimal stable rule is strategy-proof from the doctor side. We strengthen their result by showing that this rule is in fact the unique stable rule that is strategy-proof from the doctor side.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-342
Number of pages6
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Dec 1

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Keywords

  • Matching with contracts
  • Stability
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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