Abstract
In a general one-to-many matching model with contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (Ame Econ Rev 95:913-935, 2005) show that the doctor optimal stable rule is strategy-proof from the doctor side. We strengthen their result by showing that this rule is in fact the unique stable rule that is strategy-proof from the doctor side.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 337-342 |
| Number of pages | 6 |
| Journal | Review of Economic Design |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2011 Dec 1 |
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Keywords
- Matching with contracts
- Stability
- Strategy-proofness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)