A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts

Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a general one-to-many matching model with contracts, Hatfield and Milgrom (Ame Econ Rev 95:913-935, 2005) show that the doctor optimal stable rule is strategy-proof from the doctor side. We strengthen their result by showing that this rule is in fact the unique stable rule that is strategy-proof from the doctor side.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-342
Number of pages6
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Dec
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Doctors
Matching with contracts
Strategy-proofness
Strategy-proof
Matching model

Keywords

  • Matching with contracts
  • Stability
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts. / Sakai, Toyotaka.

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 15, No. 4, 12.2011, p. 337-342.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Sakai, T 2011, 'A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts', Review of Economic Design, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 337-342. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8
Sakai T. A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts. Review of Economic Design. 2011 Dec;15(4):337-342. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0105-8
Sakai, Toyotaka. / A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts. In: Review of Economic Design. 2011 ; Vol. 15, No. 4. pp. 337-342.
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