Abstract
The marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [Gale, D., L. S. Shapley. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69 9-15] and the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L. S., M. Shubik. 1972. The assignment game I: The core. Internat. J. Game Theory 1 111-130] are standard in the theory of two-sided matching markets. We give a common generalization of these models by utilizing discrete-concave functions and considering possibly bounded side payments. We show the existence of a pairwise stable outcome in our model. Our present model is a further natural extension of the model examined in our previous paper [Fujishige, S., A. Tamura. A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions. Discrete Appl. Math. 154 950-970], and the proof of the existence of a pairwise stable outcome is even simpler than the previous one.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 136-155 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2007 Feb |
Keywords
- Assignment model
- Bounded side payments
- Discrete convex analysis
- Marriage model
- Pairwise stability
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Mathematics(all)
- Computer Science Applications
- Management Science and Operations Research