An equilibrium model of child maltreatment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of human capital development of a child that can explain why a parent-child relationship might lead to child maltreatment. Assuming that a parent cannot observe a child's human capital accumulation or effort, and that the child's time preference develops endogenously, an unstable path of the parent's beliefs regarding the child can persist in equilibrium when the parent faces a high degree of uncertainty in inferring the child's human capital. The parent with an initial high estimate of the human capital then tends to underestimate the child's effort, which results in persistently punitive - abusive - interactions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)993-1025
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume30
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Jun

Fingerprint

Equilibrium Model
Human Capital
Capital Accumulation
Children
Uncertainty
Dynamic Model
Unstable
Tend
Path
Interaction
Estimate

Keywords

  • Human capital
  • Parental education
  • Time preference

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

An equilibrium model of child maltreatment. / Akabayashi, Hideo.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 30, No. 6, 06.2006, p. 993-1025.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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