An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This characterization is established on a wide class of preference domains, including the quasilinear domain, a positive income effect domain, and a negative income effect domain.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17-26
Number of pages10
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Second-price auction
Equity
Auctions
Income effect
Strategy-proofness
Envy-freeness

Keywords

  • Equal treatment of equals
  • Fair allocation
  • Non-quasilinear preference
  • Second price auction
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear. / Sakai, Toyotaka.

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2013, p. 17-26.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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