An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

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10 Citations (Scopus)


In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This characterization is established on a wide class of preference domains, including the quasilinear domain, a positive income effect domain, and a negative income effect domain.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17-26
Number of pages10
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Jan 1



  • Equal treatment of equals
  • Fair allocation
  • Non-quasilinear preference
  • Second price auction
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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