An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

Toyotaka Sakai

doi:10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5

An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

Toyotaka Sakai

Faculty of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This characterization is established on a wide class of preference domains, including the quasilinear domain, a positive income effect domain, and a negative income effect domain.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	17-26
Number of pages	10
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	17
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5
Publication status	Published - 2013 Jan 1

Keywords

Equal treatment of equals
Fair allocation
Non-quasilinear preference
Second price auction
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5

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KW - Strategy-proofness

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An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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