Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price

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4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In single-item auctions, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-imposition if and only if it is either a second price auction with a reserve price or the no-trade rule. In this characterization, any reserve price is endogenously derived from the three axioms. We also analyze relations between equity and efficiency axioms, and obtain alternative characterizations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-265
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Economic Theory
Volume9
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Sep 1

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Keywords

  • Market design
  • No-trade rule
  • Reserve price
  • Second price auction
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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