TY - JOUR
T1 - Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing
T2 - Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market
AU - Kishimoto, Shin
AU - Watanabe, Naoki
AU - Muto, Shigeo
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank Eiichi Miyagawa, Toshiji Miyakawa, Tadashi Sekiguchi, participants in the 1st SNU ICEGS (Korea), GAMES 2008 (USA), and SSSGT 2008 (Japan), an anonymous referee and an associate editor of the Journal for helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the MEXT Global COE program (Computationism as a Foundation for the Sciences, Tokyo Tech), the MEXT Grant-in-Aid 18730517 and 21730183 (Watanabe), 20310086 and 20330036 (Muto).
PY - 2011/3
Y1 - 2011/3
N2 - We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire profits of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable. The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drèze value is, however, not realized as such a stable bargaining outcome.
AB - We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire profits of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable. The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drèze value is, however, not realized as such a stable bargaining outcome.
KW - Asymptotic result
KW - Aumann-Drèze value
KW - Bargaining set
KW - Coalition structure
KW - Licensing
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U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.12.001
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.12.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79952106499
SN - 0165-4896
VL - 61
SP - 114
EP - 123
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
IS - 2
ER -