Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market

Shin Kishimoto, Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire profits of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable. The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drèze value is, however, not realized as such a stable bargaining outcome.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)114-123
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical social sciences
Volume61
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Mar

Keywords

  • Asymptotic result
  • Aumann-Drèze value
  • Bargaining set
  • Coalition structure
  • Licensing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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