College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler, Morimitsu Kurino

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)886-934
Number of pages49
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume176
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jul 1

Fingerprint

College admissions
Benchmark
Prediction
Costs
Ranking
Student effort
Lab experiment

Keywords

  • All-pay auctions
  • College admissions
  • Contests
  • Experiment
  • Incomplete information
  • Student welfare

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

College admissions with entrance exams : Centralized versus decentralized. / Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; Kurino, Morimitsu.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 176, 01.07.2018, p. 886-934.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Hafalir, Isa E. ; Hakimov, Rustamdjan ; Kübler, Dorothea ; Kurino, Morimitsu. / College admissions with entrance exams : Centralized versus decentralized. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2018 ; Vol. 176. pp. 886-934.
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