Competition for private capital and central grants: The case of Japanese industrial parks

Shun ichiro Bessho, Kimiko Terai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our results suggest that a Japanese local government's choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government's policy choices. As the value of the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts' lobby activities and their industrial park values, we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the central government in this unitary state.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-154
Number of pages20
JournalEconomics of Governance
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Jun
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Local government
Industrial park
Public infrastructure
Lobbies
Lobbying
Central government
Personnel
Locality
Intergovernmental grants
Government policy
Interaction
Policy choice
Loans
Government
Local development

Keywords

  • Infrastructure investment
  • Lobbying
  • Policy competition
  • Spatial model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business and International Management

Cite this

Competition for private capital and central grants : The case of Japanese industrial parks. / Bessho, Shun ichiro; Terai, Kimiko.

In: Economics of Governance, Vol. 12, No. 2, 06.2011, p. 135-154.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{ecf359cbb6ce4e2ea541d36c6e6d1264,
title = "Competition for private capital and central grants: The case of Japanese industrial parks",
abstract = "Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our results suggest that a Japanese local government's choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government's policy choices. As the value of the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts' lobby activities and their industrial park values, we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the central government in this unitary state.",
keywords = "Infrastructure investment, Lobbying, Policy competition, Spatial model",
author = "Bessho, {Shun ichiro} and Kimiko Terai",
year = "2011",
month = "6",
doi = "10.1007/s10101-010-0090-y",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "135--154",
journal = "Economics of Governance",
issn = "1435-6104",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition for private capital and central grants

T2 - The case of Japanese industrial parks

AU - Bessho, Shun ichiro

AU - Terai, Kimiko

PY - 2011/6

Y1 - 2011/6

N2 - Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our results suggest that a Japanese local government's choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government's policy choices. As the value of the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts' lobby activities and their industrial park values, we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the central government in this unitary state.

AB - Local governments invest in public infrastructure to develop their regions. When they depend on intergovernmental grants for local development and have opportunities to lobby upper-level governments for such grants, horizontal intergovernmental competition in lobbying activity may emerge in addition to competition over public infrastructure. This paper empirically examines the existence of these interactions between Japanese localities, by using data on the value of industrial parks as infrastructure provisions and on personnel interchanges between the central and local governments as a measure of lobbying activity. Our results suggest that a Japanese local government's choice of the size of industrial parks and its invitation to central officers to act as a director on loan are positive responses to the neighboring local government's policy choices. As the value of the industrial parks in a district is affected by the neighboring districts' lobby activities and their industrial park values, we can interpret these results as evidence of inter-regional competition in these two dimensions, rather than control by the central government in this unitary state.

KW - Infrastructure investment

KW - Lobbying

KW - Policy competition

KW - Spatial model

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79955463238&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79955463238&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10101-010-0090-y

DO - 10.1007/s10101-010-0090-y

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:79955463238

VL - 12

SP - 135

EP - 154

JO - Economics of Governance

JF - Economics of Governance

SN - 1435-6104

IS - 2

ER -