Competitive distribution channel strategy of firms under duopoly

Hiroya Ilda, Yoshiyasu Yamada, Nobuo Matsubayashi, Kazuaki Namba

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper studies strategic distribution channel decisions incorporating Internet sales for two competitive firms. Firms specifically have three alternative strategies; the pure online strategy, the traditional channel strategy (so called "bricks-and-mortar") and the "hybrid" channel strategy (so called "clicks-and-mortar"). Consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous with regard to their location, while they must incur some "interaction costs" {i.e., the out-of-pocket costs/benefits of interacting indirectly with the firms when they purchase online). Therefore, the relation between the distribution of consumers' location and the convenience of an online channel plays an important role in determining the firms' channel strategies. Based on this motivation, we analyze the equilibrium channel strategies in the presence of the ex-post competition on prices by using a game theoretic approach and explore how firms' locations and interaction costs influence the equilibrium outcome. We show that if firms' products are sufficiently differentiated from each other, the equilibrium channel strategy is determined independently of the rival's location and interaction cost, but there is an impact on equilibrium profit. This result is in a sharp contrast to the well-known necessity of differentiation to relax intense price competition. Furthermore, a sensitive analysis based on some numerical experiments suggests that unless a firm has a very attractive online channel compared to its rival's, the advantage/ disadvantage of its location rather than interaction cost is likely to contribute to creating its competitive advantage/disadvantage.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)342-354
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Japan Industrial Management Association
Volume59
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Fingerprint

Costs
Mortar
Interaction
Brick
Profitability
Sales
Strategy
Business
Duopoly
Distribution channels
Channel strategy
Internet
Profit
Likely
Numerical Experiment
Game
Alternatives
Experiments
Disadvantage
Online channel

Keywords

  • Clicks-and-mortar
  • Competitive strategy
  • Game theory
  • Hotelling model
  • Mrketing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Competitive distribution channel strategy of firms under duopoly. / Ilda, Hiroya; Yamada, Yoshiyasu; Matsubayashi, Nobuo; Namba, Kazuaki.

In: Journal of Japan Industrial Management Association, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2008, p. 342-354.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ilda, Hiroya ; Yamada, Yoshiyasu ; Matsubayashi, Nobuo ; Namba, Kazuaki. / Competitive distribution channel strategy of firms under duopoly. In: Journal of Japan Industrial Management Association. 2008 ; Vol. 59, No. 4. pp. 342-354.
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