Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au; Keiichi Kawai

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002

Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Pak Hung Au, Keiichi Kawai

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	56-78
Number of pages	23
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	119
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002
Publication status	Published - 2020 Jan
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Bayesian persuasion
Information transmission
Multiple senders

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002

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abstract = "We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.",

keywords = "Bayesian persuasion, Information transmission, Multiple senders",

author = "Au, {Pak Hung} and Keiichi Kawai",

note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to the editor and three anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and valuable comments. The second author greatly acknowledges the financial support from UNSW Sydney and Australian Research Council (DECRA Grant RG160734). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 Elsevier Inc.",

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AU - Kawai, Keiichi

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N2 - We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

AB - We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.

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KW - Information transmission

KW - Multiple senders

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Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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