### Abstract

This paper relates formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Instead of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [7] , but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. We make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence are able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.

Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 86-94 |

Number of pages | 9 |

Journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |

Volume | 4846 LNCS |

Publication status | Published - 2007 Dec 1 |

Event | 12th Asian Computing Science Conference, ASIAN 2007 - Doha, Qatar Duration: 2007 Dec 9 → 2007 Dec 11 |

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### Keywords

- Computational semantics
- Cryptographic protocols
- First order logic
- Formal methods

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)