### Abstract

This paper relates formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Instead of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [7] , but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. We make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence are able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 86-94 |

Number of pages | 9 |

Journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |

Volume | 4846 LNCS |

Publication status | Published - 2007 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- Computational semantics
- Cryptographic protocols
- First order logic
- Formal methods

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Computer Science(all)
- Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
- Theoretical Computer Science

### Cite this

**Computational semantics for basic protocol logic a stochastic approach.** / Bana, Gergei; Hasebe, Koji; Okada, Mitsuhiro.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)*, vol. 4846 LNCS, pp. 86-94.

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Computational semantics for basic protocol logic a stochastic approach

AU - Bana, Gergei

AU - Hasebe, Koji

AU - Okada, Mitsuhiro

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - This paper relates formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Instead of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [7] , but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. We make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence are able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.

AB - This paper relates formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic. Instead of the way Datta et al. defined computational semantics to their Protocol Composition Logic, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [7] , but the technique is suitable for extensions to more complex situations such as PCL. We make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence are able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence.

KW - Computational semantics

KW - Cryptographic protocols

KW - First order logic

KW - Formal methods

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=38349081077&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=38349081077&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:38349081077

VL - 4846 LNCS

SP - 86

EP - 94

JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SN - 0302-9743

ER -