Computational semantics for first-order logical analysis of cryptographic protocols

Gergei Bana, Koji Hasebe, Mitsuhiro Okada

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic As opposed to earlier treatments, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. The idea is to make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence be able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence, and so on. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [20], but we think the technique is suitable for a wide range of formal methods for protocol correctness proofs. We first review our framework of proof-system, BPL, for proving correctness of authentication protocols, and provide computational semantics. Then we give a full proof of the soundness theorem. We also comment on the differences of our method and that of Computational PCL.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationFormal to Practical Security
Subtitle of host publicationPapers Issued from the 2005-2008 French-Japanese Collaboration
Pages33-56
Number of pages24
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Jul 16

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5458 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Keywords

  • Computational semantics
  • Cryptographic protocols
  • First order logic
  • Formal methods

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • Cite this

    Bana, G., Hasebe, K., & Okada, M. (2009). Computational semantics for first-order logical analysis of cryptographic protocols. In Formal to Practical Security: Papers Issued from the 2005-2008 French-Japanese Collaboration (pp. 33-56). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5458 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02002-5_3