Computationally complete symbolic attacker and key exchange

Gergei Bana, Koji Hasebe, Mitsuhiro Okada

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, Bana and Comon-Lundh introduced the notion of computationally complete symbolic attacker to deliver unconditional computational soundness to symbolic protocol verification. First we explain the relationship between their technique and Fitting's embedding of classical logic into S4. Then, based on predicates for "key usability", we provide an axiomatic system in their framework to handle secure encryption when keys are allowed to be sent. We examine both IND-CCA2 and KDM-CCA2 encryptions, both symmetric and asymmetric situations. For unforgeability, we consider INT-CTXT encryptions. This technique does not require the usual limitations of computational soundness such as the absence of dynamic corruption, the absence of key-cycles or unambiguous parsing of bit strings. In particular, if a key-cycle possibly corrupts CCA2 encryption, our technique delivers an attack. If it does not endanger security, the security proof goes through. We illustrate how our notions can be applied in protocol proofs.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCCS 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Pages1231-1246
Number of pages16
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Dec 9
Event2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2013 - Berlin, Germany
Duration: 2013 Nov 42013 Nov 8

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN (Print)1543-7221

Other

Other2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2013
CountryGermany
CityBerlin
Period13/11/413/11/8

Keywords

  • computational soundness
  • security protocols

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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  • Cite this

    Bana, G., Hasebe, K., & Okada, M. (2013). Computationally complete symbolic attacker and key exchange. In CCS 2013 - Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (pp. 1231-1246). (Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security). https://doi.org/10.1145/2508859.2516710