Abstract
We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-26 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Networks and Spatial Economics |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2018 Mar 19 |
Keywords
- Capacitated network
- Congestion game
- Priority
- Theme park
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Artificial Intelligence
Cite this
Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes. / Masuda, Yasushi; Tsuji, Akira.
In: Networks and Spatial Economics, 19.03.2018, p. 1-26.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes
AU - Masuda, Yasushi
AU - Tsuji, Akira
PY - 2018/3/19
Y1 - 2018/3/19
N2 - We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.
AB - We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.
KW - Capacitated network
KW - Congestion game
KW - Priority
KW - Theme park
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044209401&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85044209401&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11067-018-9396-z
DO - 10.1007/s11067-018-9396-z
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044209401
SP - 1
EP - 26
JO - Networks and Spatial Economics
JF - Networks and Spatial Economics
SN - 1566-113X
ER -