Abstract
We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 293-318 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Networks and Spatial Economics |
Volume | 19 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 Mar 15 |
Keywords
- Capacitated network
- Congestion game
- Priority
- Theme park
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Artificial Intelligence