TY - JOUR
T1 - Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games
AU - Hokari, Toru
AU - Funaki, Yukihiko
AU - Sudhölter, Peter
N1 - Funding Information:
Toru Hokari received support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Grant No. KAKENHI 17K03629) and Peter Sudhölter received support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (GrantNo. ECO2015-66803-313 P (MINECO/FEDER)). Acknowledgements
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2020/12/1
Y1 - 2020/12/1
N2 - We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.
AB - We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85086096887&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85086096887&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6
DO - 10.1007/s10058-020-00231-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85086096887
SN - 1434-4742
VL - 24
SP - 187
EP - 197
JO - Review of Economic Design
JF - Review of Economic Design
IS - 3-4
ER -