Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games

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6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Many solutions for TU-games coincide with the "standard solution" for the two-agent case. We study its weighted generalizations. In particular, we study whether max consistency is compatible with "2-weighted-standardness." We show that on the domain of all TU-games, efficiency, 2-weighted-standardness, and max consistency jointly imply equal treatment of equals. It follows from this result that on the same domain, the prenucleolus is the only single-valued solution satisfying efficiency, 2-weighted-standardness, zero-independence, and max consistency. This uniqueness result does not hold on the domain of convex games. We define the family of "sequential nucleoli" on this domain, and show that this family of solutions is characterized by efficiency, 2-weighted-standardness, and max consistency.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)63-82
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume51
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Apr 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Consistency
  • Convex games
  • Equal treatment of equals
  • Reduced games
  • TU-games
  • The nucleolus

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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