Abstract
Both experimental and empirical studies have shown that democratically imposing a policy that encourages cooperation may increase its effectiveness by enhancing the voters’ cooperation behavior. But, do those involved in the democratic decision-making process change their behavior when faced with an exogenously implemented rule? This paper experimentally shows that the voters that are involved in a successful democratic selection of a policy behave more pro-socially as consistent with recent studies. My experiment moreover shows that such a successful democratic imposition of the policy may increase the voters’ level of cooperation even when the policy is undemocratically imposed.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 359-378 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
Volume | 47 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2016 Aug 1 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics