Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints (extended abstract)

Masahiro Goto, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages259-260
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781450334105
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 15
Event16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2015 - Portland, United States
Duration: 2015 Jun 152015 Jun 19

Publication series

NameEC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Other

Other16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2015
CountryUnited States
CityPortland
Period15/6/1515/6/19

Keywords

  • Deferred acceptance
  • Many-to-one matching
  • Market design
  • Matching with constraints
  • Matching with contracts
  • Strategyproofness
  • Two-sided matching

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Marketing

Cite this

Goto, M., Kojima, F., Kurata, R., Tamura, A., & Yokoo, M. (2015). Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints (extended abstract). In EC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (pp. 259-260). (EC 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764501