Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints

Masahiro Goto, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)226-262
Number of pages37
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume9
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 May 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this