Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice

Toyotaka Sakai, Masaki Shimoji

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Consider an individual whose judgments are always based on a fundamental criterion such as a political ideology or a religious doctrine. In a choice situation, he always prefers any alternative that is compatible with the criterion to any that is not. When individuals are allowed to have preference spaces restricted in this manner, we investigate Arrow-consistent domains. We observe that a diversity of attitudes is essential in order to escape an Arrovian impossibility.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)435-445
Number of pages11
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume26
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006 Jun
Externally publishedYes

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political ideology
doctrine
Social choice
Impossibility
Political ideology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice. / Sakai, Toyotaka; Shimoji, Masaki.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 26, No. 3, 06.2006, p. 435-445.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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