Dynamic pricing for network service: equilibrium and stability

Yasushi Masuda, Seungjin Whang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

51 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Consider a data communication network owned and operated by a single organization. The network has an infinite number of small users and is managed by a system manager (SM) whose objective is to maximize the net value of the system as a whole. The objective of this paper is to study pricing mechanisms that induce the optimal arrival rates when the SM has no full knowledge of the demand in advance. We investigate the system behavior under three alternative dynamic pricing rules and users' expectations models, and characterize the equilibrium and its stability conditions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)857-869
Number of pages13
JournalManagement Science
Volume45
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - 1999 Jun
Externally publishedYes

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Managers
Telecommunication networks
Costs
Dynamic pricing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Dynamic pricing for network service : equilibrium and stability. / Masuda, Yasushi; Whang, Seungjin.

In: Management Science, Vol. 45, No. 6, 06.1999, p. 857-869.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Masuda, Yasushi ; Whang, Seungjin. / Dynamic pricing for network service : equilibrium and stability. In: Management Science. 1999 ; Vol. 45, No. 6. pp. 857-869.
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