Abstract
We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 50-67 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Volume | 1 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781510868083 |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 Jan 1 |
| Event | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden Duration: 2018 Jul 10 → 2018 Jul 15 |
Other
| Other | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
|---|---|
| Country | Sweden |
| City | Stockholm |
| Period | 18/7/10 → 18/7/15 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Controlled school choice
- Distributional constraints
- M-convex set
- Strategy-proofness
- Top trading cycles mechanism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering
Cite this
Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. / Suzuki, Takamasa; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto.
17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2018. p. 50-67.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
AU - Suzuki, Takamasa
AU - Tamura, Akihisa
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.
AB - We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.
KW - Controlled school choice
KW - Distributional constraints
KW - M-convex set
KW - Strategy-proofness
KW - Top trading cycles mechanism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85055325446&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85055325446&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85055325446
SN - 9781510868083
VL - 1
SP - 50
EP - 67
BT - 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ER -