Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints

Takamasa Suzuki, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages50-67
Number of pages18
Volume1
ISBN (Print)9781510868083
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan 1
Event17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
Duration: 2018 Jul 102018 Jul 15

Other

Other17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018
CountrySweden
CityStockholm
Period18/7/1018/7/15

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Keywords

  • Controlled school choice
  • Distributional constraints
  • M-convex set
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Top trading cycles mechanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Suzuki, T., Tamura, A., & Yokoo, M. (2018). Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. In 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 (Vol. 1, pp. 50-67). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. / Suzuki, Takamasa; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto.

17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2018. p. 50-67.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Suzuki, T, Tamura, A & Yokoo, M 2018, Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. in 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. vol. 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 50-67, 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018, Stockholm, Sweden, 18/7/10.
Suzuki T, Tamura A, Yokoo M. Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. In 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. Vol. 1. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2018. p. 50-67
Suzuki, Takamasa ; Tamura, Akihisa ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Efficient allocation mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints. 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018. Vol. 1 International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2018. pp. 50-67
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