Abstract
We consider an allocation problem of multiple types objects to agents, where each type of an object has multiple copies (e.g., mult iple seats of a school), each agent is endowed with an object, and some distributional constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas). We develop a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which Is strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints). Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set. The class of distributional cons traints we consider contains many situations raised from realistic matching problems, including individual minimum/maximum quot as, regional maximum quotas, type-specific quotas, and distance constraints. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to develop a mechanism with these desirable properties.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
Pages | 50-67 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Volume | 1 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781510868083 |
Publication status | Published - 2018 Jan 1 |
Event | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden Duration: 2018 Jul 10 → 2018 Jul 15 |
Other
Other | 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2018 |
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Country | Sweden |
City | Stockholm |
Period | 18/7/10 → 18/7/15 |
Keywords
- Controlled school choice
- Distributional constraints
- M-convex set
- Strategy-proofness
- Top trading cycles mechanism
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering