Abstract
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 31-57 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 Jan 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Efficient lottery design. / Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander S.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 48, No. 1, 01.01.2017, p. 31-57.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Efficient lottery design
AU - Kesten, Onur
AU - Kurino, Morimitsu
AU - Nesterov, Alexander S.
PY - 2017/1/1
Y1 - 2017/1/1
N2 - There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.
AB - There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms that have proven to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used in real life for indivisible goods allocation. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84974827205&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84974827205&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8
DO - 10.1007/s00355-016-0978-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84974827205
VL - 48
SP - 31
EP - 57
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 1
ER -