Electoral alliance and implemented redistribution: An interpretation on non-competitive politics of Japan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article shows that a pre-election alliance between the ruling coalition parties with different ideological motivations may result in bias toward the large size of government. In equilibrium, the reelected coalition government implements a redistributive policy that is greater than the median voter's preference. The results can explain why the Japanese coalition government, which colludes for winning elections, has frequently implemented more diffuse fiscal policies than the previous single-party government.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)235-238
Number of pages4
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume10
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Mar 17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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