Environmental asset market failure, income transfer, and a reform of the tradeable emission permit system

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper focuses on the intertemporal efficiency aspect of economies with environmental resources which have stock externalities. We show why and how such an economy is concerned with intertemporal inefficiency if the property right of the resource is established and traded in a competitive asset market. Moreover, we explore how this inefficiency can be resolved by an income transfer system, and show that the system can also contribute to environmental conservation. Finally, our argument in terms of the efficiency will be applied to a tradeable emission permit system which allows the “banking” of credits. We propose that the government gives credit hoarders a subsidy per credit and allows the credits to grow, provided that they are hoarded.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)21-28
Number of pages8
JournalEnvironmental Economics and Policy Studies
Volume3
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

income
market
banking
resource
credit
Asset markets
Emission permits
Market failure
Credit
Income transfers
economy
Resources
Inefficiency
externality
environmental conservation
subsidy
right of property
Banking
Stock externalities
Subsidies

Keywords

  • Asset market failure
  • Environmental stock externalities
  • Intertemporal efficiency
  • Tradeable emission permit system

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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