Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper introduces a general framework for the fair allocation of indivisible objects when each agent can consume at most one (e.g., houses, jobs, queuing positions) and monetary compensations are possible. This framework enables us to deal with identical objects and monotonicity of preferences in ranking objects. We show that the no-envy solution is the only solution satisfying equal treatment of equals, Maskin monotonicity, and a mild continuity property. The same axiomatization holds if the continuity property is replaced by a neutrality property.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)549-563
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume43
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Jun
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Indivisible
Fairness
Monotonicity
Neutrality
Queuing
Axiomatization
Ranking
Object
Implementability
Indivisible objects
Compensation and Redress
Framework
Continuity

Keywords

  • Generalized queuing
  • Indivisible goods
  • Maskin monotonicity
  • Nash implementation
  • No-envy
  • Queuing
  • Walrasian social choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations. / Sakai, Toyotaka.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 43, No. 5, 06.2007, p. 549-563.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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