TY - JOUR
T1 - Family firms and firm performance
T2 - Evidence from Japan
AU - Saito, Takuji
N1 - Funding Information:
The author is grateful to Kazuki Yokoyama, Hiroyuki Itami, Hiroshi Osano, Mitsuaki Okabe, Katsuyuki Kubo, Shin'ichi Hirota, Hideaki Miyajima, Hiroyuki Odagiri, Yasuhiro Yonezawa, Naohito Abe, Hiroyuki Okamuro, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at Hitotsubashi University and Waseda University, and participants at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association and Nippon Finance Association, for their helpful comments. This research was partly financed by JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) and the 21st Century Center-of-Excellence Project on “Creating New Legal System for Corporation and Society” of Waseda University. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for any remaining errors.
PY - 2008/12
Y1 - 2008/12
N2 - We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in Japan. We construct a new data set on founding families, which includes data on founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder's descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder's descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 620-646.
AB - We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in Japan. We construct a new data set on founding families, which includes data on founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder's descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder's descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 620-646.
KW - Corporate governance
KW - Family firm
KW - Ownership structure
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jjie.2008.06.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jjie.2008.06.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:56349099156
VL - 22
SP - 620
EP - 646
JO - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
JF - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
SN - 0889-1583
IS - 4
ER -