Abstract
We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in Japan. We construct a new data set on founding families, which includes data on founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder's descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder's descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 620-646.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 620-646 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Journal of the Japanese and International Economies |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 Dec |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Corporate governance
- Family firm
- Ownership structure
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Finance
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
Family firms and firm performance : Evidence from Japan. / Saito, Takuji.
In: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 22, No. 4, 12.2008, p. 620-646.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Family firms and firm performance
T2 - Evidence from Japan
AU - Saito, Takuji
PY - 2008/12
Y1 - 2008/12
N2 - We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in Japan. We construct a new data set on founding families, which includes data on founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder's descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder's descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 620-646.
AB - We examine the performance of firms that are controlled by founding families in Japan. We construct a new data set on founding families, which includes data on founding family ownership, family management, and generation of family senior managers. We find that about 36% of listed firms are managed by the founder or his descendant, and founding families are the largest shareholder in about 25% of listed firms. We empirically find that family firms managed by founders are traded at a premium. After the retirement of founders, the results are mixed. The performance of family firms both owned and managed by the founder's descendants is inferior to that of nonfamily firms. In contrast, the performance of family firms owned or managed by the founder's descendants is superior to that of nonfamily firms. J. Japanese Int. Economies 22 (4) (2008) 620-646.
KW - Corporate governance
KW - Family firm
KW - Ownership structure
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=56349099156&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=56349099156&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jjie.2008.06.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jjie.2008.06.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:56349099156
VL - 22
SP - 620
EP - 646
JO - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
JF - Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
SN - 0889-1583
IS - 4
ER -