Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We examine how international coordination among countries generates a trend towards establishing an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating international agreement are a politician's motive for re-election and a financial mechanism for compliance. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizen by participating in the agreement, and is aware that his ex post deviation will be deterred by the financial mechanism, he too decides to participate in the agreement, which then corrects externality problems.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)297-308
Number of pages12
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume53
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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international agreement
International cooperation
election
compliance
externality
citizen
trend
co-ordination
Compliance
International environmental agreements
Politicians

Keywords

  • Enforceability
  • Financial mechanism
  • International environmental agreements
  • Re-election concerns
  • Time-consistency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Aerospace Engineering

Cite this

Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements. / Terai, Kimiko.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2012, p. 297-308.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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