Government deficits, political inefficiency, and fiscal reconstruction in Japan

Takero Doi, Toshihiro Ihori, Hiroki Kondo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the behavior of government deficits and fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan both theoretically and empirically. We first develop a dynamic framework of fiscal reconstruction process using the dynamic game theory among various interest groups. The distribution of a tax increase, that is, contribution of taxes to reducing public debt and raising privileges, depends on the political efficiency of lobbying activities. We also investigate empirically the relationship between the political inefficiency and the outcome of fiscal reconstruction process in the Japanese (national) general account.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-183
Number of pages15
JournalAnnals of Economics and Finance
Volume3
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2002 May 1

Fingerprint

Fiscal reconstruction
Japan
Inefficiency
Government deficits
Tax
Game theory
Public debt
Interest groups
Dynamic games
Lobbying

Keywords

  • Fiscal reconstruction
  • Government deficits
  • Political inefficiency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Government deficits, political inefficiency, and fiscal reconstruction in Japan. / Doi, Takero; Ihori, Toshihiro; Kondo, Hiroki.

In: Annals of Economics and Finance, Vol. 3, No. 1, 01.05.2002, p. 169-183.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Doi, Takero ; Ihori, Toshihiro ; Kondo, Hiroki. / Government deficits, political inefficiency, and fiscal reconstruction in Japan. In: Annals of Economics and Finance. 2002 ; Vol. 3, No. 1. pp. 169-183.
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