Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

Shinsuke Nakamura

doi:10.1007/s100580050011

Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

Shinsuke Nakamura

Faculty of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	159-165
Number of pages	7
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	3
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050011
Publication status	Published - 1998 Jan 1

Keywords

Implementation
Impossibility
Nash equilibrium
Two-agent
Walras equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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10.1007/s100580050011

Cite this

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Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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