Impossibility of Nash implementation in two-person economies

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Abstract

In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)159-165
Number of pages7
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume3
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1998 Jan 1

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Keywords

  • Implementation
  • Impossibility
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Two-agent
  • Walras equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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