Abstract
In this note, we prove two impossibility results of Nash implementation in two-person economies. First, we will show the non-existence of continuous and balanced mechanisms which implement the Walrasian correspondence. Second, by adding a convexity assumption of mechanisms, we present the impossibility of continuous implementation of Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations in balanced way.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 159-165 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Review of Economic Design |
Volume | 3 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1998 Jan 1 |
Keywords
- Implementation
- Impossibility
- Nash equilibrium
- Two-agent
- Walras equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)