Abstract
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. Varying treatments of a voluntary contribution experiment, we find that availability of higher-order punishment opportunities increases cooperation and efficiency when subjects have full information on the pattern of punishing and its history, when any subject can punish any other, and when the numbers of punishment and of contribution stages are not too unequal.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 145-159 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Volume | 120 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 Dec 1 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Counter-punishment
- Higher-order punishment
- Public goods
- Punishment
- Social dilemma
- Voluntary contribution
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management