Inference on incomplete information games with multi-dimensional actions

Hideyuki Tomiyama, Taisuke Otsu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

By extending de Paula and Tang (2012) and Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2016), we derive testable restrictions for uniqueness of equilibrium in games with multi-dimensional actions. We discuss two models of payoff functions which imply certain covariance restrictions for players’ actions. These restrictions can be used to construct an identified set of strategic parameters under multiple equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Article number110440
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume215
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022 Jun

Keywords

  • Moment inequalities
  • Multiple equilibria
  • Partial identification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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