Internal threats avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant networks

Xin Guan, Cong Liu, Min Chen, Hongyang Chen, Tomoaki Ohtsuki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In traditional delay tolerant networks (DTNs), there exists a potential assumption that the nodes are willing to help others for packet forwarding. However, in the real application scenarios, such as civilian DTNs, selfish behaviors always widely exist. Therefore, the assumption that nodes are cooperative is not realistic in all applications. Currently, most of the existing incentive mechanism focuses on individual selfish behaviors. Few research work is proposed on social selfish behavior in DTNs. In this paper, we stimulate the nodes to cooperate with others by using a virtual bank mechanism. This incentive mechanism can effectively avoid individual selfish behaviors. Meanwhile, we observe that under this individual selfish incentive mechanism, the social distribution is unfair. That means the poverty nodes would appear in the networks, and become the internal threats for the social DTNs. To avoid this, we introduce the Gini coefficient to measure the inequality of the social distribution. Furthermore, by using the taxation strategy, we avoid the internal threats caused by social selfishness. To demonstrate the selfish behavior, we introduce the forwarding protocol which is based on social relations of nodes. We verify the proposed methods using simulation evaluations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE International Conference on Communications
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Event2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: 2011 Jun 52011 Jun 9

Other

Other2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011
CountryJapan
CityKyoto
Period11/6/511/6/9

Fingerprint

Delay tolerant networks
Taxation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Guan, X., Liu, C., Chen, M., Chen, H., & Ohtsuki, T. (2011). Internal threats avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant networks. In IEEE International Conference on Communications [5962592] https://doi.org/10.1109/icc.2011.5962592

Internal threats avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant networks. / Guan, Xin; Liu, Cong; Chen, Min; Chen, Hongyang; Ohtsuki, Tomoaki.

IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2011. 5962592.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Guan, X, Liu, C, Chen, M, Chen, H & Ohtsuki, T 2011, Internal threats avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant networks. in IEEE International Conference on Communications., 5962592, 2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011, Kyoto, Japan, 11/6/5. https://doi.org/10.1109/icc.2011.5962592
Guan X, Liu C, Chen M, Chen H, Ohtsuki T. Internal threats avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant networks. In IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2011. 5962592 https://doi.org/10.1109/icc.2011.5962592
Guan, Xin ; Liu, Cong ; Chen, Min ; Chen, Hongyang ; Ohtsuki, Tomoaki. / Internal threats avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant networks. IEEE International Conference on Communications. 2011.
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