Intraboard heterogeneity and the role of bank-dispatched directors in Japanese firms: An empirical study

Takuji Saito, Hiroyuki Odagiri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

To discuss the role of bank-dispatched directors in the governance of Japanese firms, it has to be noted that the board is heterogeneous and only senior directors, including presidents and managing directors, are likely involved in major management decisions. With a panel of about 1150 firms in 1990-98, we find that, when bank loans constitute a significant portion of the firm's assets, the low industry-adjusted profitability increases the probability that a new (or additional) director is dispatched from the bank at a senior level but not at a junior level. This dispatch improves the firm's performance provided it does not merely replace the predecessor.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)572-590
Number of pages19
JournalPacific Basin Finance Journal
Volume16
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Nov
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Empirical study
Japanese firms
Firm performance
Bank loans
Industry
Profitability
Management decisions
Assets
Governance

Keywords

  • Corporate governance
  • Director
  • Japanese firm
  • Main bank

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Intraboard heterogeneity and the role of bank-dispatched directors in Japanese firms : An empirical study. / Saito, Takuji; Odagiri, Hiroyuki.

In: Pacific Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 11.2008, p. 572-590.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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