Learnability and equilibrium selection under indeterminacy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper presents an equilibrium selection procedure for linear rational expectations models under equilibrium indeterminacy. In the procedure, a specific equilibrium is chosen such that the perceived law of motion for agents with adaptive learning rules converges to the particular solution. The procedure is applicable only under empirically implausible parameter settings if the agents perceive fundamental shock processes completely. However, if they misperceive the fundamental shocks in some degree, the procedure works under plausible parameters. It is also demonstrated that the selected particular solution exhibits different dynamics from that under the assumption often made in the literature.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3459-3477
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume32
Issue number11
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Nov
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Equilibrium Selection
Learnability
Indeterminacy
Particular Solution
Shock
Rational Expectations
Adaptive Learning
Selection Procedures
Converge
Motion
Equilibrium selection
Model

Keywords

  • Equilibrium selection
  • Expectational stability
  • Indeterminacy
  • Learning
  • Rational expectations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics

Cite this

Learnability and equilibrium selection under indeterminacy. / Hirose, Yasuo.

In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 32, No. 11, 11.2008, p. 3459-3477.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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