Manipulative zero-stealthy attacks in cyber-physical systems: Existence space of feasible attack objectives

Takumi Shinohara; Toru Namerikawa

doi:10.1109/CCTA.2017.8062609

Manipulative zero-stealthy attacks in cyber-physical systems: Existence space of feasible attack objectives

Takumi Shinohara, Toru Namerikawa

Department of System Design Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the vulnerabilities due to novel integrity cyber attacks in CPS, which are modeled as a stochastic Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) system equipped with a Kalman filter, an LQG controller, and a χ² failure detector from an attacker's standpoint. The attacks are designed by a sophisticated attacker so that the measurement residual of the compromised system coincides with the healthy one. Additionally, the attacked system state is manipulated to an objective which is designed by the adversary. We first show an existence condition and a design procedure of the stealthy attacks using invariant subspace property. Then, we formulate the stealthy attacks with a malicious objective, and the condition of the feasible objectives is derived. Finally, the dangerousness of the attacks is verified through a numerical simulation.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	1st Annual IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2017
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	1123-1128
Number of pages	6
Volume	2017-January
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509021826
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CCTA.2017.8062609
Publication status	Published - 2017 Oct 6
Event	1st Annual IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2017 - Kohala Coast, United States Duration: 2017 Aug 27 → 2017 Aug 30

Other

Other	1st Annual IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2017
Country	United States
City	Kohala Coast
Period	17/8/27 → 17/8/30

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
Hardware and Architecture
Software
Control and Systems Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/CCTA.2017.8062609

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Manipulative zero-stealthy attacks in cyber-physical systems : Existence space of feasible attack objectives. / Shinohara, Takumi; Namerikawa, Toru.

1st Annual IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2017. Vol. 2017-January Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 1123-1128.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Shinohara, T & Namerikawa, T 2017, Manipulative zero-stealthy attacks in cyber-physical systems: Existence space of feasible attack objectives. in 1st Annual IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2017. vol. 2017-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1123-1128, 1st Annual IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2017, Kohala Coast, United States, 17/8/27. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCTA.2017.8062609

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