Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

Keisuke Bando

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm's preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)14-20
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume48
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jan
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Externalities
  • Many-to-one matching market
  • Stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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