Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This study is related to a Condorcetian problem of information aggregation that finds a "true" social ordering using individual orderings, that are supposed to partly contain the "truth". In this problem, we introduce a new maximum likelihood rule and analyse its performance. This rule selects an alternative that maximizes the probability of realizing individual orderings, conditional on the alternative being the top according to a true social ordering. We show that under a neutrality condition of alternatives, the probability that our rule selects the true top alternative is higher than that of any other rule.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)271-284
Number of pages14
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume66
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 1

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Social choice rule
Maximum likelihood
Information aggregation
Neutrality

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Maximum Likelihood Social Choice Rule. / Nakamura, Yuta.

In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 2, 01.06.2015, p. 271-284.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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