Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment

Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

By employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how varying or eliminating feedback about payoffs affects: (1) subjects’ learning about the underlying relationship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs in weighted voting games; (2) the transfer of acquired learning from one committee choice problem to a similar but different problem. In the experiment, subjects choose to join one of two committees (weighted voting games) and obtain a payoff stochastically determined by a voting theory. We found that: (i) subjects learned to choose the committee that generates a higher expected payoff even without feedback about the payoffs they received; (ii) there was statistically significant evidence of “meaningful learning” (transfer of learning) only for the treatment with no payoff-related feedback. This finding calls for re-thinking existing models of learning to incorporate some type of introspection.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-23
Number of pages23
JournalTheory and Decision
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2017 Feb 2

Fingerprint

Politics
voting
Learning
Feedback
experiment
learning
Experiments
introspection
Weights and Measures
Weighted voting games
Experiment
Voting
evidence
Transfer (Psychology)

Keywords

  • Experiment
  • Learning
  • Two-armed bandit problem
  • Voting game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

Cite this

Meaningful learning in weighted voting games : an experiment. / Guerci, Eric; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Watanabe, Naoki.

In: Theory and Decision, 02.02.2017, p. 1-23.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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