Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

Toru Hokari

doi:10.1007/s003550200160

Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

Toru Hokari

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as "monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions." We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	825-844
Number of pages	20
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	19
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200160
Publication status	Published - 2002 Oct 1
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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AB - It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as "monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions." We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.

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Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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