Abstract
It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as "monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions." We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 825-844 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 Oct |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Cite this
Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games. / Hokari, Toru.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 19, No. 4, 10.2002, p. 825-844.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games
AU - Hokari, Toru
PY - 2002/10
Y1 - 2002/10
N2 - It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as "monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions." We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.
AB - It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as "monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions." We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0036771901&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s003550200160
DO - 10.1007/s003550200160
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036771901
VL - 19
SP - 825
EP - 844
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
IS - 4
ER -