Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market

Takashi Hayashi, Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers as it wishes. We show that the competitive equilibrium correspondence (CEC) is the smallest Nash implementable correspondence satisfying individual rationality and Pareto indifference. Furthermore, the CEC is the minimal monotonic extension of the worker-optimal and firm-optimal subcorrespondences. We offer two "good" mechanisms that implement this correspondence in Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)453-467
Number of pages15
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume38
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Nov 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Indivisible goods
  • Job-matching
  • Many-to-one matching
  • Mechanism design
  • Monotonic extension
  • Nash implementation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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