Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game

Miyu Yoshihara, Toru Namerikawa, Zhihua Qu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we deal with the charging scheduling optimization problem of electric vehicle using Stackelberg game. Stackelberg game is one of game theory classified as hierarchical, repeating, and non-cooperative game. The charging station determines the price to maximize its own profit from selling energy and each EV determines the energy demand to maximize the charge benefit by competing with other EVs. At this time, we guarantee that Nash equilibrium exists within the EV group. Finally, using numerical simulation, we show that the game reaches an Stackelberg equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1658-1663
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9784907764609
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct 15
Event57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018 - Nara, Japan
Duration: 2018 Sep 112018 Sep 14

Other

Other57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018
CountryJapan
CityNara
Period18/9/1118/9/14

Fingerprint

Stackelberg Game
Electric Vehicle
scheduling
Game theory
games
Electric vehicles
charging
Profitability
Sales
vehicles
Maximise
Scheduling
Stackelberg Equilibrium
optimization
Non-cooperative Game
Optimization
Computer simulation
Game Theory
Energy
Nash Equilibrium

Keywords

  • Charging scheduling
  • Electric vehicle
  • Stackelberg game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Control and Optimization
  • Instrumentation

Cite this

Yoshihara, M., Namerikawa, T., & Qu, Z. (2018). Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. In 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018 (pp. 1658-1663). [8492699] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699

Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. / Yoshihara, Miyu; Namerikawa, Toru; Qu, Zhihua.

2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. p. 1658-1663 8492699.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yoshihara, M, Namerikawa, T & Qu, Z 2018, Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. in 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018., 8492699, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1658-1663, 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018, Nara, Japan, 18/9/11. https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699
Yoshihara M, Namerikawa T, Qu Z. Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. In 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. p. 1658-1663. 8492699 https://doi.org/10.23919/SICE.2018.8492699
Yoshihara, Miyu ; Namerikawa, Toru ; Qu, Zhihua. / Non-Cooperative Optimization of Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicle via Stackelberg Game. 2018 57th Annual Conference of the Society of Instrument and Control Engineers of Japan, SICE 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. pp. 1658-1663
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