Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

Biung Ghi Ju, Eiichi Miyagawa, Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

46 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group. By allowing agents' characteristics to be multi-dimensional and choosing the meaning of variables appropriately, our model can subsume a number of existing and new allocation problems, such as cost sharing, social choice with transferable utilities, income redistribution, bankruptcy with multiple types of assets, probability updating, and probability aggregation. A number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-26
Number of pages26
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume132
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Jan
Externally publishedYes

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Claims problems
Bankruptcy
Allocation problem
Bankruptcy problems
Transferable utility
Assets
Liquidation
Cost sharing
Social choice
Income redistribution
Resources

Keywords

  • Bankruptcy problem
  • Bayes rule
  • Flat tax
  • Linear opinion pool
  • Manipulation via merging or splitting
  • No advantageous reallocation
  • Proportional rule
  • Reallocation-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations. / Ju, Biung Ghi; Miyagawa, Eiichi; Sakai, Toyotaka.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 132, No. 1, 01.2007, p. 1-26.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ju, Biung Ghi ; Miyagawa, Eiichi ; Sakai, Toyotaka. / Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2007 ; Vol. 132, No. 1. pp. 1-26.
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