Note on stable mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability

Takayuki Watanabe, Nobuo Matsubayashi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the stability of mergers between firms in a Cournot market. Unlike most existing works, we consider a demand structure where the substitutability between firms is asymmetric. We specifically focus on the stability of the grand coalition by analyzing the core allocation, The main result of our analysis shows that the grand coalition becomes stable, as the market is more asymmetric in terms of substitutability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2024-2033
Number of pages10
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume33
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2013 Nov 12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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