Note on stable mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability

Takayuki Watanabe, Nobuo Matsubayashi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the stability of mergers between firms in a Cournot market. Unlike most existing works, we consider a demand structure where the substitutability between firms is asymmetric. We specifically focus on the stability of the grand coalition by analyzing the core allocation, The main result of our analysis shows that the grand coalition becomes stable, as the market is more asymmetric in terms of substitutability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2024-2033
Number of pages10
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume33
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Mergers
Substitutability
Core allocation
Cournot

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Note on stable mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability. / Watanabe, Takayuki; Matsubayashi, Nobuo.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2013, p. 2024-2033.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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